WORSWICK, P.J.
¶ 1 Olympic Tug & Barge, Inc. (Olympic) appeals the superior court's denial of its motion for partial summary judgment and award of summary judgment dismissal to the Department of Revenue (DOR). The superior court ruled that Olympic's activities did not fall under the business and occupation (B & O) tax classification for stevedoring and associated activities set forth in RCW 82.04.260(7). We affirm.
¶ 2 The facts in this case are undisputed. Olympic is a Washington corporation in the business of operating tugboats and barges. Relevant to this appeal, Olympic performs fuel bunkering services, which consist of delivering bunker fuel
¶ 3 Olympic has litigated its assessed taxes for several years. It has paid the public utility tax (PUT) since 1994. See chapter 82.16 RCW. Olympic sued the DOR for a partial refund of PUT paid on its fuel bunkering revenues for the tax years 2003 through 2008. It argued that it owed only the business and occupation (B & O) taxes for stevedoring and associated activities and not the higher PUT.
¶ 5 We review a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment de novo.
¶ 6 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. Cashmere Valley Bank v. Dep't of Revenue, 181 Wn.2d 622, 631, 334 P.3d 1100 (2014). `We endeavor to effectuate the legislature's intent by applying the statute's plain meaning, considering the relevant statutory text, its context, and the statutory scheme.' Cashmere, 181 Wash.2d at 631, 334 P.3d 1100. When a statute includes general terms in conjunction with specific terms, we deem the general terms "only to incorporate those things similar in nature or `comparable to' the specific terms." Simpson Inv. Co. v. The Dep't of Revenue, 141 Wn.2d 139, 151, 3 P.3d 741 (2000). Only if the statute remains ambiguous after this plain meaning analysis do we proceed to look at other sources of interpretation, such as legislative history. The Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We avoid reading a statute in a way that produces absurd results. Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 663-64, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007).
¶ 7 Olympic argues that the superior court erred by denying its motion for partial summary judgment and granting the DOR's motion for summary judgment dismissal because Olympic's fuel bunkering activities were subject to the stevedoring tax classification. We disagree.
¶ 8 This appeal concerns which of two taxes applies to Olympic's fuel bunkering revenues, the higher PUT or the lower B & O tax. The PUT, found in chapter 82.16 RCW, applies to a number of public service businesses, including tugboat businesses. RCW 82.16.020(1)(f). A "tugboat business" is defined as "the business of operating tugboats, towboats, wharf boats or similar vessels in the towing or pushing of vessels, barges or rafts for hire." RCW 82.16.010(10). The DOR has assessed the PUT on Olympic's fuel bunkering services for years.
¶ 9 The B & O tax statute provides:
RCW 82.04.260(7). Thus, the B & O tax applies to businesses performing "stevedoring and associated activities," and such businesses are exempt from the PUT. RCW 82.04.260(7).
¶ 10 The statute then defines "[s]tevedoring and associated activities pertinent to the conduct of goods and commodities in waterborne interstate or foreign commerce" as
RCW 82.04.260(7). Thus, to come under the statute, an activity must be of a type involving the loading or unloading of cargo over, under, or onto a wharf, pier, or similar structure.
¶ 11 Finally, the statute identifies the specific activities included in the definition of "[s]tevedoring and associated activities pertinent to the conduct of goods and commodities in waterborne interstate or foreign commerce":
RCW 82.04.260(7) (emphasis added). In summary, the B & O tax classification exempts certain revenues from the PUT if they are derived from "stevedoring and associated activities." RCW 82.04.260(7). "[T]erminal stevedoring and incidental vessel services" include those specific activities listed in the statute. RCW 82.04.260(7).
¶ 12 Olympic argues that under the plain meaning of the stevedoring tax classification, Olympic's fuel bunkering services are "stevedoring `and associated activities'" because they are "`incidental vessel services.'"
¶ 13 It is undisputed that Olympic's fuel bunkering services do not involve loading fuel "onto the vessels by passing the bunker fuel over, onto or under a wharf, pier, or similar structure." Clerk's Papers at 66. This renders the entire definition of "stevedoring and associated activities" inapplicable to Olympic because the legislature defined that classification as "all activities of a labor, service, or transportation nature whereby cargo may be loaded or unloaded to or from vessels or barges, passing over, onto or under a wharf, pier, or similar structure." RCW 82.04.260(7). Thus, we hold that Olympic's business does not fall within the plain meaning of the definition of "stevedoring and associated activities."
¶ 14 Nevertheless, Olympic argues that the subsection's final sentence, listing types of "stevedoring and associated activities pertinent to the conduct of goods and commodities in waterborne interstate or foreign commerce" applies to Olympic because one such type is "terminal stevedoring and incidental vessel services." Br. of Appellant at 19. Olympic argues that fueling a vessel is an "incidental vessel service" because "without the fuel provided by Olympic's services the vessel, and the cargo with which it has just been loaded, would be unable to move to interstate or foreign destinations." Br. of Appellant at 20. Thus, Olympic argues that fueling a vessel is an "incidental vessel service" that is "pertinent to the conduct of goods and commodities" and falls within the subsection.
¶ 15 But Olympic misreads the statute's plain language. Reading "incidental vessel services" in its statutory context, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to include every service that is incidental to a vessel. First, the phrase "incidental vessel services" does not appear in isolation; instead, it appears as the phrase "terminal stevedoring and incidental vessel services." RCW 82.04.260(7). Because "incidental vessel services" is a general term appearing in conjunction with the specific term "terminal stevedoring," we deem "incidental vessel services" to incorporate only "those things similar in nature or `comparable to'" terminal stevedoring. Simpson Inv. Co., 141 Wash.2d at 151, 3 P.3d 741.
¶ 16 Furthermore, we read this phrase in conjunction with the rest of the statutory section. There is no punctuation between "terminal stevedoring" and "incidental vessel services," but semicolons divide the other groups of examples from each other.
¶ 17 Second, we read "terminal stevedoring and incidental vessel services" within the
¶ 18 Third, we avoid reading the statute to produce the absurd result that anything "incidental" to the movement of cargo is exempt from the PUT. See Tingey, 159 Wash.2d at 663-64, 152 P.3d 1020. Olympic argues that its interpretation is not so broad as to encompass any service related to cargo movement, and that it instead encompasses only "business activities that take place while a ship is in port, and which facilitate the movement of goods and commodities in and out of Washington." Br. of Appellant at 22 n. 10. But were we to adopt Olympic's interpretation, there would be no language in the statute to limit these "incidental vessel services" to those that occur in port. Adopting Olympic's reading of the statute to apply to fuel bunkering would require broadening the exemption to include an extensive list of services "incidental" to waterborne commerce, whether or not they relate to the loading or unloading of cargo. We decline to adopt the broad reading that Olympic urges. See Olympic Tug & Barge, 163 Wash.App. at 307, 259 P.3d 338.
¶ 19 Thus, we hold that the plain language of the stevedoring tax classification does not apply to Olympic's fuel bunkering. Olympic does not transport cargo over or under a wharf or similar structure, so the definition of "stevedoring and associated activities" does not apply. Moreover, the plain meaning of the phrase "terminal stevedoring and incidental vessel services" does not include all services incidental to a vessel; instead, it includes vessel services incidental to terminal stevedoring. Finally, Olympic's interpretation of the statute would lead to an absurd result, exempting countless "incidental" vessel services unrelated to stevedoring from the PUT, all under an exemption designed for stevedoring and associated activities. Accordingly, we hold that the superior court did not err by denying Olympic's motion for partial summary judgment and granting the DOR's motion for summary judgment dismissal and we affirm the superior court's order.
We concur: MAXA and LEE, JJ.
Olympic argues that this determination is dispositive here because Olympic's fueling services are equally necessary to the movement of cargo as is vessel berthing. We disagree. As we discuss below, Olympic's activities do not fall under the plain meaning of "stevedoring and associated activities." Moreover, wharfage is not at issue in this case.